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 SUMMARY 
 
The paper critically summarises and fuses two previously distinct analyses of the 
theory of the firm: the competence-based and strategic choice approaches. We 
thereby identify the essence of the problem of organising production in a modern 
economy: to create and use knowledge so as to make choices over the strategic 
direction of activity, which may then facilitate the further creation and use of 
suitable knowledge. Recognising that this knowledge governance perspective 
makes creativity an integral concern, we explore what that involves by 
considering a particular criterion for assessing economic relations, behaviours 
and activities: a Deweyan concentration on the interests of publics. Our analysis 
treats creativity very differently to that in topical debate about ‘creative industries’ 
and market competitiveness. We point to the significance of creativity from all 
people with an interest in the organisation of production, not in the pursuit of 
private objectives, but so that public interests might be served and no person be 
denied the joy of using their ideas and imagination so as to cause things to 
happen. Although achievement of such outcomes on a widespread scale might 
seem an ideal, we point to the practical potential of ‘public creativity networks’: 
socio-economic networks of mutual dependence in which creativity can be 
supported and nurtured through communication, so that together people might 
not only identify publics, but also realise the interests of those publics. 
Accordingly we advocate public policies to support such networks. 
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‘… there is the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, 
though not necessarily, also a dynasty. The modern world really does 
not know any such positions, but what may be attained by industrial or 
commercial success is still the nearest approach to medieval lordship 
possible to modern man … Then there is the will to conquer: the 
impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the 
sake, not of the fruits of success, but of the success itself. From this 
aspect, economic action becomes akin to sport … Finally, there is the 
joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of exercising one’s 
energy and ingenuity’  
(Schumpeter (1912, p. 93) on the motives of entrepreneurs) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Creativity is a topical issue because of the argument that it can offer firms 
and territories competitive advantage in a global context. One reason for this is 
that in the last few years there has been increasing stress on the potential of 
‘creative industries’ as a source of market generated wealth (Caves, 2000; Florida, 
2002). However, such analysis has not centred on creativity as significant for the 
fundamentals of how industries are actually organised, which is the subject of 
this paper. 
A second reason that creativity is a topical subject is because of the view 
that in a modern knowledge economy the focus of market competitiveness is the 
pursuit of inter-related aims such as productivity growth, high-value and 
innovation (OECD, 1996), which are argued to depend (in part) on people’s 
creative potential. However, we would argue that this approach has tended to 
focus on creativity amongst exclusive groups of people in economies that are 
hierarchical and constraining because of concentrated power – the sort of 
economy reflected in Rothschild (2005). In contrast, this paper considers the 
potential of people more generally; most especially, it is concerned with publics.  
We hypothesise that empowering publics in the organisation of production 
by unleashing their creative capacities in the governance process would fulfil 
currently unimagined potential. In effect our focus is on catalysing widespread 
entrepreneurship in the third sense identified by Schumpeter (1912, as quoted 
above; which is not to say that Schumpeter himself would have seen that as 
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possible or desirable). Consistent with this, the paper culminates in proposals for 
public policies that stimulate and nurture people’s imagination, that provide 
forums for expression and interaction, and that therefore raise the possibility of 
people shaping and seizing innovative opportunities for new organisation.  
The substance of our analysis begins with a discussion of an essential 
factor in production organisation, in Section II. The intention is to offer an 
enlightening perspective (without presuming it to be all-encompassing) that 
focuses consideration on core issues, in particular on knowledge governance 
(where governance here refers not to government – as in Quibria (2006) – but to 
the power to control production, to determine its strategic direction). The 
originality in this Section is its marrying of two previously distinct strands of 
heterodox economic analysis on the theory of the firm: we critically summarise 
and fuse the competence-based and the strategic choice approaches.1 Thus we 
identify the essence of the production organisation problem in a modern economy 
as being the creation and use of knowledge so as to make choices over the 
strategic direction of activity, which may then facilitate the further creation and 
use of suitable knowledge.  
This analysis is direct in its reference to imagination and ideas being used 
so as to cause things to happen; in other words, explicit in its focus on creativity 
as integral to the production organisation problem.2 What more particularly this 
might involve is then assessed, using a criterion that we develop in Section III.  
The novelty of this criterion is an express focus on ‘public interests’, some 
notion of which typically sits behind much of economics but in an obtuse way; 
what public interest might mean and entail rarely emerges into the shadows, let 
alone the limelight. Specifically, as a suitable assessment standard we draw 
especially on Dewey (1927) and build from Branston et al (2006a) in advocating 
the interests of publics.  
In Section IV we use that criterion to explore the requirements for, and 
implications of, creativity in the organisation of production from a knowledge 
governance perspective. These are taken up in Section VI, which concludes the 
paper with some remarks about its policy consequences, including the prospect 
of catalysing ‘public creativity networks’. 
                                                 
1 Heterodox in economics, the competence based approach is considered mainstream in business schools. 
2 According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press), creativity refers to the use of ideas 
and imagination so as to cause something to happen, including bring something into existence. 
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II. KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 
Drawing on the insights of Penrose (1959),3 the seminal contribution by 
Richardson (1972) provides a basis to explain different modes of organisation. He 
reasons that the firm and the market are not the only means for co-ordinating 
production, as Coase (1937) has been argued to suggest. Rather, further 
possibilities include ‘complex networks of co-operation and association’ amongst 
firms (p. 892). He warns that there is no ‘sharp line of distinction’ between 
modes, rather (p. 887):  
‘a continuum passing from transactions … where the co-operative 
element is minimal, through intermediate areas in which there are 
linkages of traditional connection and goodwill, and finally to those 
complex and inter-locking clusters, groups and alliances which 
represent co-operation fully and formally developed.’ 
The particular stress of the 1972 paper is the inter-firm ‘co-operative 
element in business relations’ (p. 895), but the concepts that Richardson 
identifies are seen as explicitly relevant to production organisation more 
generally. These are issues that he takes up in subsequent work, notably 
Richardson (1998) on intra-firm industrial organisation. 
To explain why one form of co-ordination emerges instead of another 
Richardson (1972) builds on the Penrose (1959) argument that knowledge, 
experience and skills constitute capabilities, which define what a firm can do. He 
(p. 888-889) conceives of industry as carrying out ‘activities’. These are ‘similar’ 
when they ‘require the same capability for their undertaking.’ Whether similar or 
dissimilar, activities may also be ‘complementary’, in which case ‘they represent 
different phases of a process of production and require in some way or another to 
be co-ordinated.’ He reasons that firms tend to focus on similar activities (both 
complementary and not); and that non-isolated firms interact with each other so 
as to ensure quantitative and qualitative coordination of dissimilar but 
complementary activities. More particularly, ‘complex networks of co-operation 
and association … exist because of the need to co-ordinate closely complementary 
but dissimilar activities’ (p. 892). 
                                                 
3 On which see Richardson (2002). 
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A clear implication of this summary of Richardson’s insights is the critical 
significance of knowledge. For him, capabilities are the driver of the analysis and 
knowledge is the essence of capabilities (a point that is incontrovertible once it is 
recognised that the essence of experience and skill are reducible to particular 
forms of knowledge). Hence the ‘knowledge problem’ is the essence of the problem 
of organising production. 
 
II.1. Competence 
Together, Richardson (1972) and Penrose (1959) provide the precursors to 
the so-called competence-based view of the firm, developed more recently in the 
work of, for example, Prahald and Hamel (1990) and Teece and Pisano (1994). 
This view has also been the subject of contributions that address issues in the 
knowledge-based economy, including Amin and Cohendet (2000), Steinmueller 
(2000) and Cohendet and Meyer-Krahmer (2001), and that convincingly place 
knowledge at the centre of modern production activity.  
For Amin and Cohendet (2000, p. 93-94), the competence-based view 
conceives the firm in the following terms: 
‘A processor of knowledge (Fransman, 1994), a locus for setting up, 
selecting, using and developing knowledge… [This] leads to the 
recognition that cognitive mechanisms are of central importance and 
that routines play a major role in keeping the internal coherence of the 
organisation.’  
Therefore, it is argued, for a given firm the ways in which knowledge is produced, 
absorbed, memorized, shared and transferred become major concerns.  
In line with this view, the creation and use of knowledge is analysed to 
necessitate commitment, including finance and resources invested in its 
development, transmission and reproduction. It follows that the creation and use 
of competences by an organisation is subordinate to the way in which the 
organisation commits itself to the creation and use of its knowledge assets.  
Further, the creation and use of these assets requires co-ordination; 
recalling Hayek (1945) and echoing the language of Richardson (1972), in the 
competence-based approach ‘a primary role of the organisation becomes that of 
co-ordinating the dispersed knowledge’ (Amin and Cohendet, 2000, p. 97). In fact, 
the commitment required to create and to use knowledge might be so high that it 
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points to the desirability of co-operation and association across networked 
organisations. For example, the more the acquisition of complementary pieces of 
knowledge entails dissimilar activities, the greater the commitment that would be 
required from a single organisation for it to undertake such activities internally, 
but the relatively better placed might be complementary organisations to co-
operate in acquiring that knowledge. 
More precisely what the co-ordination of knowledge might require is also 
indicated by Amin and Cohendet (2000, p. 97) when they point to the possible 
need for ‘commonly shared bodies of knowledge – sets of facts, notions, “models 
of the world”, rules and procedures which are – at least partly – known to all the 
members of the organisation involved in a given interaction.’ Again this echoes 
Richardson, who suggested that co-ordination across organisations relies on 
‘reciprocal undertakings, habits or conventions’ (Richardson, 1998, p. 47). 
However, whilst this previous literature has identified elements through 
which commitment could be realised and coordination implemented, a drawback 
is that it does not provide an in-depth consideration of how those elements might 
be governed. More specifically, we would argue that when analysing the 
organisation of industry the competence-based view on knowledge needs to be 
complemented by a strategic choice perspective on the governance of activity (see, 
inter alia, Cowling and Sugden, 1998a, 1998b; Branston et al, 2006a).   
 
II.2. Strategic choice 
This perspective has strong ties with Penrose in its rejection of 
determinism. Severely criticizing the relevance of biological analogies in 
explaining the development of firms, Penrose (1952, p. 818) concludes:  
‘our knowledge of why men do what they do is very imperfect, but there 
is considerable evidence that consciously formulated human values do 
affect men’s actions, that many decisions are reached after a conscious 
consideration of alternatives, and that men have a wide range of 
genuine choices.’  
Likewise the strategic choice approach: it embraces voluntarism – albeit in the 
context of an analysis founded on the importance of economic power4 – and 
                                                 
4 Contrast the voluntary exchange principle at the core of extreme mainstream approaches, including perfect 
competition. 
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emphasises people’s positive freedom to act (Cowling and Sugden, 1998b; Bailey 
et al, 2006). 
The approach focuses on the governance of economic processes and 
systems, and the actors therein, in the sense of analysing which people make 
strategic decisions, on what basis and to what effect. Its contention is that the 
critical (but not exclusive) determinant of what does or might occur in production 
activity is strategic choice. Each and every type of economic process, system and 
organisation is argued to be characterised by a particular type of governance, and 
different types of governance are associated with different efficiency and 
distribution effects (on which see Cowling and Sugden, 1998a).  
In the case of inter-firm co-operation, for example, Sacchetti and Sugden 
(2003) distinguish two types of network governance. First, a network of direction 
is a system to plan activities according to the exclusive objectives of a core, with 
or without the agreement of others. Strategy making across and within the 
network is dominated by the core; in the extreme, a core firm decides about 
network firms’ relations with each other and with ‘outside’ firms, as well as about 
firms’ geographical orientation and other elements of strategy (on the scope of 
which, see Zeitlin, 1974). Such circumstances enlarge the borders of the core firm 
from those defined by its legal boundaries to those defined by its ability to direct 
resources in the network. Those resources include directed firms as reservoirs of 
investment capacity, economies of scale and, indeed, knowledge. Second, and in 
stark contrast, a network of mutual dependence features the absence of 
hierarchy and, therefore, no strategic decision-making core. Rather, strategies are 
defined consistently with the interests shared by all the actors; there is a diffuse 
process of co-ordination amongst partners that allows and encourages each and 
every firm in the network to contribute to strategic choice. 
Within and across a network, the commitment to creating and using 
knowledge and the co-ordination of this process would differ significantly 
according to whether it is a network of direction or of mutual dependence. For 
example, there would be a difference in the choice of – and search for – common 
rules and models of the world. Whilst a network of mutual dependence would 
have an interest in developing shared bodies of knowledge that enable each and 
every actor to participate in joint production activities on equal terms, a network 
of direction is of its essence based on unequal relations and would have no 
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positive concern with such knowledge. On the contrary, its core organisation 
might prefer such knowledge to remain hidden. Moreover, this causality operates 
in reverse. In a network of direction, a concern with creating and using knowledge 
that fosters the concentration of strategic decision-making power in the core, 
might enable the core to strengthen its hold on strategic choice. The strategic 
options that are available and the strategic choices that are made depend 
crucially on the creation and use of knowledge, because it is that knowledge 
which is the essence of capabilities.  
Consider more specifically the case of Italian industrial districts, recently 
argued to have been moving towards a ‘leadership’ model in which technology 
transfers from the lead firm to its suppliers. Some observers have viewed this as a 
desirable trend because, it is argued, the leader can stimulate modernisation 
across the district, taking it towards new competencies and higher 
competitiveness (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999; Brioschi et al, 2002; Guerrieri 
and Pietrobelli, 2004). In contrast, we would be more cautious in our assessment. 
There might be no advantage for a district in adopting a leader model - a network 
of direction – because that would imply a concentration of power in the leader 
and, perhaps, a corresponding restraint on others, whose interests might 
therefore be undermined. We would stress in particular that the more that the 
creation and use of knowledge depends upon a core firm whose role and therefore 
objective is to determine network strategy, the better placed is that core to 
succeed in its objective. Were it to do so, however, there is nothing in the model 
to require the decision-making leader to (continue to) take account of the wider, 
public interests in the district.  
 
II.3. The essence of production organisation 
Drawing this discussion together, then, we suggest a characterisation of 
production that focuses on two inter-acting elements, knowledge and strategic 
choice. The concern with each element follows two previously separate strands of 
literature, respectively: the depiction of knowledge as central to understanding 
the organisation of production activity; the emphasis on decisions over strategy 
as the critical determinant of what does or might occur in production activity. A 
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stress on their interaction is an implication from our discussion of the 
competence-based view of the firm.  
We conclude that in the organisation of production the strategic options 
that are available and the choices that are made depend crucially on the creation 
and use of knowledge, because it is that knowledge which is the essence of 
capabilities. However, there is also a reverse causality: both the commitment to 
creating and using knowledge and the co-ordination of this process depend 
crucially on the strategic options available.  
More succinctly, the essence of the problem of organising production in a 
modern economy is to create and use knowledge so as to make choices over the 
strategic direction of activity, which may then facilitate the further creation and 
use of suitable knowledge.5 
 
III. THE INTERESTS OF PUBLICS 
If this perspective is valid it clearly positions creativity as an integral 
concern at the heart of the organisation of production: it reasons that an 
essential problem is to use imagination and ideas so as to cause things to happen 
– specifically, so as enable choices to be made over the strategic direction of 
production.  
The perspective treats the subject of creativity differently to topical 
arguments about so-called creative industries, increasingly focused upon in 
recent years as a potential source of market generated wealth for particular firms 
and territories.  Caves (2000, p. 1) has suggested that whilst economists have 
studied most sectors ‘that display some distinctive form of competitive behaviour 
or pose distinctive problems for public policy,’ they have long missed the 
‘industries supplying goods and services that we broadly associate with cultural, 
artistic, or simply entertainment value.’ The idea is that visual and performing 
arts, indeed cultural activities more generally, are associated with the production 
of goods and services that can be traded on markets to desirable economic effect 
(see also Florida, 2002). In contrast our focus differs, not least because it 
embraces creativity as an issue in the organisation of production, and it spans 
                                                 
5 The word ‘suitable’ implies knowledge relevant to the making of choices over the strategic direction of economic 
activity (as against other forms of knowledge). 
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industries more widely (which is consistent with its being applicable to so called 
creative industries; and in a cross-sector, perhaps macro-economic context, to its 
perhaps being relevant to choices about those as against other industries).6 
More incisively, however, our analysis not only embraces industries in 
general, it enables creativity to be thought about in terms of people in general. It 
can provide insight into which people may be engaged in using their imagination 
and ideas or, from the reverse angle, into which people may be constrained in 
their creativity.  
To understand this we need to consider an aspect of the strategic choice 
approach to production governance in more detail, notably its explicit concern 
with public interests as a criterion for assessing economic relations, behaviours 
and activities.7 
 
III.1. A criterion for economic assessment 
Economics has employed many varied criterion when analysing actual, potential or indeed hypothetical situations. 
Different criteria can provide complementary insights, each offering a particular dimension from which to understand 
and assess. In part this variety no doubt reflects the breadth of views, and differences of opinion, about the meaning and 
content of economic science. Nevertheless, despite economics being ‘notoriously difficult to define’ (Backhouse, 2002, 
p. 3), for many economists it clearly entails a concern with satisfying human interests; for example, many are likely to 
agree that economics ‘is about how production is organised in order to satisfy human wants’ (Backhouse, 2002, p. 4).8 
This suggests that it is legitimate to focus on the interests accounted for as a basis for assessing economic relations, 
behaviours and activities.  
What more precisely is meant by the notion of ‘interests’ has been pursued 
in contributions to the strategic choice approach to the theory of the firm 
(especially Branston et al, 2006a; 2006b). Consistent with those, we here identify 
a spectrum of governance possibilities that is reflected in a parallel spectrum of 
different private and public interests that may, or may not, be accommodated in 
any particular organisation.  
As illustrated by the earlier review of network types, according to the 
strategic choice approach governance possibilities (in hypothetical situations and 
in practice) range from relations based on direction to those characterised by 
                                                 
6 Choice amongst sectors – for example, of where to target public policy – presumably depends on the perceived 
relevance of each sector to achieving competitiveness, or more broadly the aims of economic development (Branston et 
al, 2006b). That relevance would likely be impacted by the manner in which a sector creates and uses knowledge 
affecting its strategic direction. 
7  Policy-makers are sometimes heard to profess a concern with public interests as an assessment criterion, without 
necessarily being at all clear what such interests entail. Indeed, Eichenberger and Frey (2002, p. 269) remind us that 
politicians’ ‘civic virtue, which mirrors the intrinsic motivation of the … politicians to contribute to the public interest, 
… is an indispensable factor for a successful democracy.’ By drawing in detail on Dewey and others, our paper offers a 
clarification of what public interests entail, especially as regards creativity and the organisation of production. 
8 A drawback with this approach is that it is human-centric. Non-human animal and wider environmental interests might 
also be deemed pertinent. 
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mutual dependence. For example, in an inter-firm network of direction there is 
hierarchy and concentration of power in an exclusive core – in other words, 
concentration in the hands of specific private interests. (The precise make-up of 
those private interests might vary across situations; some networks might have a 
narrower core with a correspondingly diminished set of private interests.) In 
contrast, in an inter-firm network of mutual dependence there is a diffused 
process for identifying and pursuing shared interests. There is mutual agreement 
about the network’s objectives and its strategy more generally. This does not 
mean that each of its firms, individually, necessarily has the same strategy. 
Rather, each may have a unique approach, but each nonetheless has a strategy 
that is consistent with each other and with the overall strategy of the network as 
a whole. In making a strategic choice, the decision-makers in each firm are aware 
that their acts impact on the interest of others in the network, not least on those 
determining the strategy in other firms.  
Following Branston et al (2006a), an exclusive core might be expected to 
govern in pursuit of its own objectives (on the basis of the standard assumption 
in economics that decision-makers opt for choices in their own best interests), 
hence to adopt strategies that other interested parties (following other objectives) 
would not implement if they were making the decisions. However, this is argued 
to imply a significant and so-called strategic failure, because it is desirable for 
production to be undertaken ‘in the broader interest – in the interest of the 
community at large’ (Cowling and Sugden, 1999, p. 361). In direct contrast, it is 
also argued that there would be no such strategic failure with a diffused process 
appropriately based on the identification and pursuit of shared interests; to use 
the terminology of Branston et al (2006a), no failure with a process that 
appropriately reflected public and not merely private interests.  
This reference to public interests is based on Dewey’s (1927) seminal 
analysis. The idea is that an act – for example, the making of a strategic choice – 
might have significant consequences both for those directly engaged in it, and for 
others. The direct participants are said to have private interests in the act, 
whereas the others have public interests.  Dewey (1927) is also clear in 
acknowledging that an act might bring into existence more than one public, each 
of which, according to Long (1990, p. 171), has ‘a shared concern with 
consequences’ of the private act.  
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Our conclusion is that an act governed by direction fails because it ignores 
public interests, which is the complete opposite of what happens under mutual 
dependence, where strategic choices reflect the interests of each and every public.   
 
III.2. Current reality 
By way of illustration and further explanation, Figure 1 positions reality 
under (the current form of) globalisation as depicted in Rothschild 
(2005) within the parallel spectra of governance and interests that we 
have been discussing.  
 
FIGURE 1: GOVERNANCE AND INTERESTS UNDER CURRENT GLOBALISATION
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On the left hand side of the Figure we map the spectrum of governance 
possibilities, ranging from mutual dependence to direction. Parallel to this, on the 
right hand side we map the accommodation of interests, from publics to private.  
Rothschild (2005, p. 444) sees the world as in a state of rapid change, due 
in part to technological influences that provided opportunities for ‘large-scale 
production and organization’ across much of economic activity. For him: 
  
‘These opportunities, connected with a political and 
ideological turnabout to an extreme neo-liberalism, which 
meets – with its emphasis on liberalisation, deregulation, 
and privatization – the interests of the quickly spreading 
big and transnational companies, created the explosive 
mixture of globalisation and world-wide liberalisation 
which lies behind many new developments and problems.’ 
 
In particular, he sees the large transnationals as having ‘become – nationally and 
internationally – an especially powerful interest group’ (p. 445). In fact, his 
analysis is very much in line with the strategic choice approach to the theory and 
impact of the firm; the latter is rooted most notably in an analysis of 
transnational corporations, focusing both on the exclusive determination of the 
strategic direction of such firms, and on their power and influence in economic 
systems (inter alia Cowling and Sugden (1998a) on the essence of the firm; see 
also Cowling (2006), positioning such theory in an appreciation of prosperity and 
depression in modern economies). 
In other words, Rothschild is painting a picture in which the world’s 
economies are being driven by powerful firms who follow their own, private 
interests with little regard for the publics that they impact upon. Hence we depict 
current reality in the space defined by the extreme ends of the governance and 
interests spectra in Figure 1. 
 
IV. INTERESTS IN CREATIVITY  
We earlier (at the start of Section III) positioned creativity as an integral 
concern in the organisation of production: it was reasoned that an essential 
problem is to use imagination and ideas so as to enable choices to be made over 
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strategic direction. However, the assessment criterion that we have just presented 
makes it clear that if this direction is concentrated in private hands, then it will 
be those private interests that determine the strategy of knowledge creation and 
use. Therefore, in such a case the stress on creativity will not be on publics, 
rather there will be a confinement to the use of imagination and ideas amongst (a) 
those constituting the private interests and (b) others, but then only in 
furtherance of the private interests and subject to the governance of those 
interests. 
For example, referring again to the reality of current globalisation 
illustrated in Figure 1, the implication is that the power of the private interests 
governing transnational corporations is used so as to restrain and constrain 
creativity more generally. Echoing Schumpeter (1912, p. 93), we might argue that 
exclusive interests governing transnational corporations either represent private 
kingdoms, or/and are the consequence of attempts to conquer, to prove 
superiority over others; we would certainly argue that the governance approach 
would seek either to deny to most people ‘the joy of creating, of getting things 
done, or simply of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity’, or to harness and 
constrain the fruits of such creativity for narrow, private gain.9 It is inherent to 
such a reality that creativity is constrained because public interests are denied.10 
Again, then, we are suggesting that creativity be treated quite differently to 
that in other, topical analysis. In particular, there has been considerable 
attention on creativity as a significant determinant of innovation, high value and 
productivity growth, the inter-related aims underpinning the search for 
competitiveness, hence competitiveness policies, in modern market economies 
under globalisation (OECD, 1996). Indeed, such attention can be associated with 
the competence-based analysis of the firm. However, whereas that creativity 
argument is made in the context of an economy that is hierarchical and 
constraining because of concentrated power (and in fact is an analysis that pays 
                                                 
9 Some might argue that not all people have the inherent capabilities to create. We would dispute such a view, not least 
citing Chomsky (1975) in his analysis of education, emphasising the inherent creativity in each person. 
10 It might be argued that public interests are served in situations where all economic actors narrowly pursue their own 
private interests. For example, some might contend that public interests are reducible to Pareto optimality, and that the 
likes of Debreu (1959) and Arrow and Hahn (1971) show that an economy can be in Pareto optimality when actors 
pursue their narrow self interests under conditions of perfect competition. However, Rothschild (2005) is based upon 
the empirical validity of a reality characterised by power and imperfect competition. Nevertheless, even in such cases it 
might still be argued that public interests are served, for example through policies that seek to correct market failures. 
The difficulty with that argument would be its presumption that policy makers know the interests of publics despite, 
according to Dewey (1927), those publics being themselves unaware of their own existence (Branston et al, 2006a; 
2006b). 
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virtually no attention to such governance concerns (Branston et al, 2006a)), we 
would treat creativity differently, focusing not on the creativity of an exclusive 
group (or indeed ‘class’, as Florida (2002) argues) but instead on the potential of 
people more generally.  
 
 
 
IV.1. What is in the interests of publics? 
 An obvious answer to this question is that it is not in the interests of 
publics that their interests are denied; rather, they need to be met. Accordingly, 
we suggest that the fundamental creativity requirement in the organisation of 
production is for all publics to be able to use their imagination and ideas so as to 
make choices over strategic direction. Put another way, the interests of publics 
necessitate the publics’ empowerment in the use of their imagination and ideas. 
What precisely this would require raises complex issues and difficulties 
encompassing many factors; assuming Rothschild (2005) is correct, the world’s 
economies are currently at one end of the governance/interests spectra (shown in 
Figure 1) but the requirement would be a shift to the opposite extreme.  
However, indications as to how such a move might need to begin are 
suggested by Dewey (1927), whose immediate concern is the state and political 
democracy but whose insights have wider import. Analysing the implications for 
acting in the public interest, he reasons that ‘the prime difficulty’ is discovery of 
‘the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognise 
itself as to define and express its interests’ (p. 327). Moreover, this basic necessity 
for recognition and expression takes him to ‘the problem of the public’, namely 
‘the essential need’ for ‘the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion and persuasion’ (p. 365).  
Dewey (1927, p. 323-324) argues that people ‘have the physical tools of 
communication as never before’ but that: 
 
‘The thoughts and aspirations congruous with them are not 
communicated, and hence are not common. Without such 
communication the public will remain shadowy and formless, 
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seeking spasmodically for itself, but seizing and holding its shadow 
rather than its substance.’ 
 
Interestingly, given our critical reliance on the approach in establishing the 
knowledge governance perspective, the competence-based view of the knowledge 
economy evokes this stress on communication. For example, Amin and Cohendet 
(2000, p.99) consider effective knowledge circulation in an organisation as 
associated with ‘dialogue, discussion, experience-sharing’, and to ‘socialising 
activities’. Associated with this, we noted earlier (in Section II.1) that knowledge 
creation and use are argued to be influenced by firms’ networking. More 
generally, the idea is that networks are instruments that may extend the 
opportunities of participants. Creativity can be viewed as in significant part a 
cognitive phenomenon generated through interaction and socialisation; repeated 
contacts and joint activities can activate the cognitive resources of individuals 
and therefore, we would add, of publics, thus generating new possibilities. For 
these reasons, networking might stimulate communication and convey new 
stimuli, enhancing learning opportunities in perhaps unique ways, possibly 
leading to currently unimagined outcomes. 
We therefore suggest that, in the first instance, empowering publics in the 
use of their imagination and ideas depends on people - the members of actual 
and potential publics - engaging with each other in appropriate socio-economic 
networks. The focus of the networks needs to be debate, discussion and 
persuasion. However, because the object would be the enabling of publics in the 
organisation of production, it would be inappropriate for such communication to 
be based on private interests, otherwise private aims would dominate and there 
would likely be a failure to shift current reality along the spectrum depicted in 
Figure 1. Rather, the need is for people to begin to build networks of mutual 
dependence focused on the methods and conditions of communication.  
Openness would consequently be a prerequisite, raising issues about 
network size and the propensity of participants to share information (David, 
1998; Foray, 2000), and about the suitable mix between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ ties 
(Granovetter, 1983; also Burt (1992) on ‘structural holes’). People would need to 
have an interest in each other’s ideas and perspectives, even if they would not 
share or support those ideas and perspectives. They would need to (be able to) 
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clarify why they do not share others’ ideas, and we suggest that their reasons 
would need to be buttressed by coherent arguments, so as to anchor the 
foundations for the creativity. We hypothesise that from this basis people could 
start – with respect for each other and hence for publics – to discuss and talk 
with others, to share arguments and mutually influence ideas by increasing – 
through discussion – the diversity of perspectives and possibilities on the 
organisation of production. We further hypothesise that the outcomes would fulfil 
currently unimagined potential.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An original contribution of this paper is to critically summarise and fuse 
two previously distinct analyses of the theory of the firm: the competence-based 
and strategic choice approaches. We follow Richardson in identifying the 
‘knowledge problem’ as the essence of understanding what is entailed in 
organising production; adopt the stress of the strategic choice literature on 
economic governance as the essential determinant of what does or might occur in 
production activity; criticise the competence based approach for sidelining 
strategy in its otherwise insightful analysis of an organisation’s commitment to, 
and coordination of, the creation and use of knowledge. Drawing these strands 
together, we conclude that the essence of the problem of organising production in 
a modern economy is to create and use knowledge so as to make choices over the 
strategic direction of activity, which may then facilitate the further creation and 
use of suitable knowledge. 
Recognising that this perspective identifies creativity as an integral 
concern, the paper explores what more precisely that involves by presenting and 
then considering a specific criterion for assessing economic relations, behaviours 
and activities: we follow Dewey in concentrating on the interests of publics. Our 
analysis recognises the significance of creativity from all people with an interest 
in the organisation of production, not so that some can found a kingdom or 
merely engage in a form of sport, but so that public interests might be served and 
so that no person might be denied the joy of using their ideas and imagination so 
as to cause things to happen. Achieving such outcomes on a widespread scale 
might seem an ideal, but we also point to the potential of what might be called 
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‘public creativity networks’, more specifically: socio-economic networks of mutual 
dependence in which creativity can be supported and nurtured through 
communication, so that together people might not only identify publics, but also 
realise those publics’ interests.  
Following Cowling and Sugden (1998a), if the deliberate intention was a 
significant shift from a current reality of globalisation that is simultaneously 
focused on governance by direction and the pursuit of private interests, then 
purposive public policy would be essential. They consider (ibid, p. 82-83) a 
challenge to the power of large transnational corporations through the 
development of production networks that capture key elements of experience in 
Italian industrial districts, and conclude:    
‘The shifting of the boundaries between the domains of the major 
corporations and the industrial districts in favour of the latter … would 
need to be done as a matter of purposive public policy rather than 
evolving naturally… [This] does not deny the social efficiency of the 
industrial district; rather it reflects a realistic assessment of the power 
of the major corporations.’ 
A similar conclusion would hold as regards our more specific concern with 
shifting the emphasis of creativity in the organisation of production; leave matters 
to existing private organisations, chance or hope, and entrenched power would 
sniff out flames of change.  
However, even if the ambition were not to take on the power of the 
transnational corporations at a global level, we would continue to advocate the 
desirability of purposive policy to catalyse appropriate public creativity networks. 
That is because the experiences most people have from their everyday lives under 
current globalisation are very far removed from the potential that we have 
identified, hence encouragement and opportunity for change would typically 
necessitate the deliberate support of policy; suitable networks might be expected 
to erupt in some sense spontaneously in some circumstances, but more generally 
that would seem to be at best extremely unlikely.  
To this end we would emphasise that information and learning 
opportunities – hence policy towards the education system, scientific research, as 
well as broadcasting media – are crucial. For example, providing people with 
valuable insights on alternative possibilities is part of an appropriate 
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communication process, as is the opportunity to explore those insights. These are 
preconditions on the ability of people to access knowledge and build their own 
understanding of issues that might be of public concern. Viewed from another 
dimension, access to such opportunities may emancipate, where here 
emancipation refers to the capability to discuss, to exert critical thinking on 
relevant issues with respect to one’s interests, including one’s participation in 
and understanding of various publics.  
Moreover, we would stress that the stimulation of public creativity 
networks puts under scrutiny the influence of artistic activities, including visual 
and performing arts, writing, sound recording and cinema. These are included in 
the activities of so-called creative industries and, as we have observed, have been 
highlighted for their potential contribution to market generated wealth in a 
modern economy. For that reason they are important in the economics of 
creativity. However, the implication of our arguments is that artistic activities are 
especially significant to economic understanding for another, different reason: it 
is because of their impact as an essential viaticum for the stimulation and 
expression of people’s awareness, imagination and critical thinking. Indeed, there 
is a sense in which we view people’s access to and participation in artistic 
activities as the starting-point, a crucible for catalysing public creativity networks 
that might lead to such a shift in production organisation that publics could use 
their imagination and ideas so as to make choices over strategic direction.11 
                                                 
11 This is to suggest that artistic activities can have ex post consequences, but it does not argue that they should be 
pursued as ex ante functional to those consequences. We would not advocate planning of artistic activities so that they 
impact on people’s creativity in the economy. Indeed, there is a sense in which any attempt to plan ex ante functional 
consequences might limit the achievements of artistic activities, and in the extreme it might be argued that any 
constraint of artistic freedom runs the risk of constraining imagination and analytical powers more generally, including 
in the economic sphere. 
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